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I. Repeated Commitments to Unknown Lands
Let me start my comments on Prof. Terachi’s excellent presentation by calling
the country of today’s subject “Lay-us,” instead of “La-os,” because that is the
way President John F. Kennedy called it in his first State of the Union Message in
January 1961―almost immediately after his first encounter with the Laotian
problem―although he soon corrected it and started to talk about his policy toward
“La-os,” not “Lay-us.” The fact that he could not pronounce the name of this
country accurately clearly shows how limited the knowledge of the policymakers
in Washington, including the president himself, was with regard to the place
where they were almost dispatching American ground troops.
Laos was not an exception. It was among the many spots in the world that
could be regarded as “terra incognita,” a land completely unknown to the
Americans―an expression by Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense under
Presidents Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, to describe the Vietnam experience.
As a nation pledged to maintain the world order, the United States has made
commitments all around the globe, even in such distant countries as Laos or
Vietnam, despite its unfamiliarity with their histories, cultures, social and political
backgrounds, even the roots of the conflicts.
Such remoteness both in terms of geography and psychology, or intimacy,
could easily become a serious obstacle for American diplomacy to be successful.
If diplomatic or military blunders in those unfamiliar places cannot be avoided,
what the Americans can and should do is to keep in mind what they did and why
they did it, and try to avoid the repetition of the same mistakes in the future.
However, unfortunately, they overlooked the lessons that they had learned in
Korea before plunging themselves into another quagmire in Vietnam. As Prof.
Terachi shows us today, they could not remember what had happened in Laos.
Even the tremendous fear of “another Vietnam” was at least temporarily cast
aside after September 11, 2001, resulting in the deadlocked war in Iraq. It will
not be long before warning against “another Iraq” or cry of “no more Iraqs” will
be added to the vocabulary of American diplomatic history, which is already full
of forgotten wars, quagmires and disasters. That is why we are here, discussing
America’s past experience, and why I find Prof. Terachi’s talks very significant to
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us all.
II. Was Neutral Laos Really a Failure?
Prof. Terachi insists that America’ s escape from Laos by negotiated
settlement in 1962 was a failure. Indeed, the Geneva solution was full of ironies
and tragedies. First, the price of temporary peace proved to be very high, causing
numerous deaths and destructions.
Second, agreement in Laos became an introduction to another, more agonizing
war in Vietnam. President Kennedy was severely criticized for his apparent
weakness in Laos, which fortified his belief that the United States should hold the
line in Vietnam at any cost.
Third, the Geneva negotiation and the development after the agreement was
signed, especially North Vietnam’s violation of the accords, increased American
distrust toward further talks with the Communists. The U.S. Government, for
example, refused to give any serious consideration to proposals of neutralization
of Vietnam or Southeast Asia made by French President Charles de Gaulle or
Cambodia’s Price Norodom Sihanouk.
Yet, the Geneva Accords in 1962 could still be regarded as a success for
American diplomacy. First, it was the best kind of solution that the United States
could have expected, with the position of the right-wing faction in Laos wholly
collapsing even with American strong backing. The Americans hated to be
involved in an all-out civil war. They also wanted to avoid a humiliating
diplomatic defeat. Other options left for them were probably either partition of
the country, which would possibly begin a prolonged warfare as had been
witnessed in Vietnam after 1954, or complete Communist triumph.
Second, as Prof. Terachi points out, neutral Laos with a coalition government
was merely a face-saving solution, and nothing more than that. But to save its
own face was sometimes very crucial for a great power like the United States. It
was also important for President Kennedy himself as a politician. It would have
been so for any other president.
Third, President Kennedy’s position before the Cuban Missile Crisis in that
October was so weak that it was very difficult for him to resist strong pressure for
military action in Laos. Under such circumstances, he did his best by utilizing
what Prof. Terachi calls “two track policy” of negotiation and show of strength.
In sum, President Kennedy can be defended by asking, “What else could he do?”
While my evaluation might be too favorable to him, I wish to have Prof. Terachi’s
further comments on this so that we can have a better understanding on this
matter.
III. Diplomatic Battles against America’s Allies
Let me turn to another subject: the relations between the United States on the
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one hand, and Laos and South Vietnam on the other. In each country, the
Americans were faced with serious conflicts with intransigent allies within the
anti-Communist bloc―such local leaders as Phoumi Nosavan in Laos and Ngo
Dinh Diem in South Vietnam. So embarrassing were these diplomatic battles
against America’ s “enemy within”―a phrase that Robert F. Kennedy, the
president’s brother and Attorney General, used to describe his struggle against
Mafia, a formidable enemy within the United States. Tough pressure tactics,
including threat of terminating aid, as well as mild persuasion, worked neither
with Phoumi nor with Diem. America’s influence over its own “creation” or
“instrument,” as described by W. Averill Harriman of the State Department, was
wholly limited.
Phoumi and Diem were too weak to stand on their own feet. The United
States knew that withdrawal of its support to them might lead to victories of the
Communists, the Pathet Lao or the National Liberation Front (Viet Cong)―a
possibility that the United States least wanted. It is true that the Kennedy
Administration actually stopped its aid to South Vietnam in the fall of 1963 as one
last effort to have Diem accept American demands. But even then, aid cut was
only selective lest it should hamper the entire war efforts and was made into effect
in a muted way to save Diem’s face. Here is an irony: the weaker a client
government is within its own territory, the stronger it can be in its negotiating
position with its patron, the United States.
America’s leverage was also limited by its long-held Cold War perception.
Anti-Communist South Vietnam was vital to the security of Southeast Asia and
the Pacific as a whole, and thus indispensable to the United States. It was
essential for the defense of South Vietnam to hold Laos, and especially its
southern half―“Laos Panhandle” as was then called―which contained the Ho
Chi Minh Trail, Hanoi’s infiltration routes into South Vietnam.
The United States could not let Laos as well as South Vietnam go. President
Kennedy once described America’s preferences of local leaders in Latin America:
first, a decent and democratic regime; second, an undemocratic but anti-
Communist regime; third, a Communist regime. The United States, in many
cases including conflicts in Southeast Asia, hoping for the days of the first to
come, had to be satisfied with the second, because the third might come up at any
moment.
IV. Continuous Search for Alternate Leadership
Both Phoumi and Diem resisted American pressures. Just as Phoumi
protested the United States for its treatment of Laos as “a small child,” as shown
by Prof. Terachi, a South Vietnamese Foreign Minister condemned the CIA
because they were making his country that of “boys.” In essence, the Laotians
were the Laotians, and the Vietnamese were the Vietnamese, no matter how
dependent they were upon American aid and support.
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Realizing that Phoumi and Diem were not only ineffective but also
uncooperative, the Americans had to find an alternate indigenous leadership.
They were fortunate in Laos because they had Souvanna Phouma. He was not an
anti-Communist leader, but he was not a Communist, either, and was permissible.
His government was considered to have a better chance of survival against the
threat posed by the Communists.
In Vietnam, the Americans were not so lucky. The Kennedy Administration
was embarrased to find virtually no alternative to Diem’s rule. In a real sense of
the word, his only alternative was Ho Chi Minh in Hanoi―collapse of the anti-
Communist government in Saigon. While the Americans could not abandon
Diem, the military and political situations in that country worsened day by day.
Finally, in early November 1963, the Americans had South Vietnamese military
leaders overthrow the Diem regime and form a new government. But that proved
to be an illusionary solution. Diem’s dictatorship ended, only to be replaced by
political chaos and vacuum, the period of “revolving door,” according to
McNamara’s recollection, in which one leader after another appeared.
History of America’ s commitment in Vietnam was that of consecutive
“solutions” and “experiments.” At the beginning, President Harry S. Truman
supported French selection of Bao Dai, former Vietnamese emperor, as a head of
the state that the French had created. When France was defeated and Vietnam
was divided in 1954, President Dwight D. Eisenhower picked up Ngo Dinh Diem.
In 1963, President Kennedy helped establish General Duong Van Minh’s military
government. Then came Ngueyn Khanh, Ngueyn Van Thieu, Nguyen Cao Ky,
and so on. It was always easy for the Americans to blame such indigenous
leadership for what had gone wrong with their commitment without any serious
reconsideration or reappraisal of American policy itself.
V. A Living Myth of Conflict-Localization
There were indeed some moments of rethinking. In Laos during 1961-62 as
well as in Vietnam after 1968 were such occasions. The United States in both
cases pursued a two-way policy: to disengage itself from a seemingly endless
civil war and, simultaneously, to prevent that country from slipping away from
American hands. Their method was to localize the conflict by building a strong
army and a stable government so that victory could still be achieved without
massive American commitment. But there are several problems in this approach.
First, in Vietnam, the United States wanted “Vietnamization” of the conflict
from the very beginning, since it was essential, as President Kennedy once
described, that the conflict should remain “their war.” But the Vietnamese Army
never became reliable. Nor its government was able to maintain order. Thus the
war had to be Americanized in the mid-1960s, essentially because the United
States had failed to Vietnamize it before then.
Second, the United States had provided the anti-Communist Vietnamese army
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with arms, equipments, training, military doctrine, and tactical advice, because of
their belief that troops manufactured after an American model could defeat their
enemy with ease, since the U.S. armed forces were the strongest in the world.
Continuous efforts to consolidate the South Vietnamese government derived from
their conviction that American-style democracy could be introduced across the
Pacific and would be effective, because it was the best way of government ever in
history. Ironically, their quest for localization of the conflict was based upon
successful Americanization of that country, or creation of “little America.”
Finally, it seems that the American people still cannot dispense with an
illusion, or a myth, of conflict-localization magic: the war can be won in a
cheaper way by letting the people living there fight on behalf of the United States;
the Americans can make a trustworthy government and a reliable army, because
they know very well how to do the jobs; they can solve any problem arising
between the U.S. Government and the indigenous leaders; they can move any
country to the direction that they want. These are the features that we witnessed
both in Laos and in Vietnam several decades ago. Those experiences, I believe,
are still giving us some important lessons, and one of Prof. Terachi’s aims today
is to remind us of them.
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